Political Thought: Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Wollstonecraft, Mill, Marx, Gramsci, Arendt, Fanon, Mao and Rawls

Unit 2's own document is a bare list of sixteen names and nothing else — Confucius through Rawls — which means every fact in this chapter must be supplied from what each thinker is actually known for in the history of political thought, not from a syllabus gloss. This is Political Thought, not a general 'great books' survey: the questions NET asks are about a thinker's specific concept and text (Hobbes's Leviathan and the state of nature, Rousseau's general will, Rawls's original position), so this chapter is organised chronologically in four groups of four, each thinker given their defining concept, their key text, and one distinction that separates them from their nearest neighbour on the list.

1. Ancient and Renaissance realism — Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli

Four founding figures
ThinkerKey text/ideaCore political claim
Confucius (551–479 BCE)The AnalectsGood government rests on the ruler's own virtue (de) and on ren (benevolence) and li (ritual propriety), not chiefly on law and punishment; the ruler governs as a father governs a family, by moral example that the people naturally follow.
Plato (c. 428–348 BCE)The RepublicJustice in the state mirrors justice in the soul — each of three classes (guardians/philosopher-rulers, auxiliaries/warriors, producers) performing its own proper function; rule belongs to philosopher-kings who alone grasp the Form of the Good through reason, not to the many.
Aristotle (384–322 BCE)PoliticsMan is a 'political animal' (zoon politikon) who achieves the good life only within the polis; classifies constitutions by rule of one/few/many and by whether rule serves the common good (monarchy, aristocracy, polity) or the ruler's own interest (tyranny, oligarchy, democracy as he uses the term) — and favours a middle-class-dominated 'polity' as the most stable.
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527)The Prince (1513)Separates politics from conventional morality: a ruler must know how to act like both the lion (force) and the fox (cunning), being willing to do evil when necessity (necessità) demands it to maintain the state — it is 'better to be feared than loved' if one cannot be both.
⚠️ Confucius is not a legalist, and Plato is not Aristotle
Confucius's rule-by-virtue is explicitly contrasted in Chinese thought with the rival Legalist school's rule by strict law and harsh punishment (Han Feizi) — a question naming 'law and punishment as the basis of order' is testing whether you know Confucius rejected exactly that. Plato subordinates the individual to a rigid tripartite class structure ruled by philosopher-kings; Aristotle instead favours a mixed, middle-class 'polity' and is empirical/classificatory (comparing 158 actual constitutions) where Plato is abstract and ideal.

2. Social contract and idealism — Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel

Three social-contract thinkers compared, plus Hegel
ThinkerState of natureContract creates
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)'Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short' — a war of all against all, driven by competition, diffidence and glory.An absolute, indivisible sovereign (the 'Leviathan') to whom all rights are irrevocably surrendered in exchange for peace and security — no right of rebellion.
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689)Relatively peaceful, governed by natural law and reason, but insecure — inconvenient without an impartial judge to enforce natural rights (life, liberty, property).A limited government holding only the power entrusted to it, bound by a trust; the people retain a right of revolution if the government breaches that trust.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762)Originally free and equal ('noble savage'), corrupted by the invention of private property and society into inequality and dependence.Each person submits to the 'general will' (volonté générale), the common good the community as a whole wills, not the mere sum of private wills; obedience to it is obedience to oneself, and it may 'force people to be free'.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel breaks from social-contract individualism entirely. In the 'Philosophy of Right' (1821), the state is not a device individuals construct to protect pre-existing rights — it is the highest, most rational stage of the dialectical unfolding of Spirit (Geist) in history, the actualisation of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that reconciles individual freedom with the community, superseding the merely private freedom of the family and the merely self-interested 'civil society' of the market. Hegel's dialectic itself (thesis-antithesis-synthesis, popularly rendered though Hegel's own vocabulary differs) is what Marx later inverts from idealist to materialist terms.

🧠 Match the phrase to its author
'Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short' → Hobbes. 'Forced to be free' / the general will → Rousseau. A trust that can be broken, reviving a right of revolution → Locke. Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) reconciling individual and community → Hegel. Do not attribute the state of nature itself to Rousseau's 'noble savage' as identical to Hobbes's war of all against all — they are opposite starting points.

3. Liberal reform to Marxism — Wollstonecraft, Mill, Marx, Gramsci

  • Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) — argues women's apparent inferiority is produced by an education that trains them for ornamental dependence rather than reason, not by nature; women are entitled to the same rational education and civic standing the Enlightenment claims for men, making her a founding figure of feminist political thought within the liberal tradition.
  • John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859) — the harm principle: the only legitimate ground for society to interfere with an individual's liberty of action is to prevent harm to others, never merely for the individual's own good ('over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign'); Considerations on Representative Government (1861) worries representative democracy may produce a 'tyranny of the majority' crushing minority opinion and individuality, and defends plural voting weighted toward the educated as a partial safeguard.
  • Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (1848, with Engels) and Das Kapital — historical materialism and class struggle (met in chapter 2's Marxism section); adds here the specific claim that the capitalist state is not a neutral arbiter but 'a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie', and that capitalism's own contradictions (overproduction, falling profit, alienation of labour) drive it toward proletarian revolution.
  • Antonio Gramsci — hegemony and the 'war of position' (met in chapter 2); adds the concept of the 'organic intellectual', drawn from and rooted in a class, who articulates that class's worldview and helps it contest hegemony, unlike 'traditional intellectuals' who see themselves as an autonomous, class-neutral group.

4. Twentieth-century political thought — Arendt, Fanon, Mao, Rawls

Four twentieth-century thinkers
ThinkerKey textCore claim
Hannah ArendtThe Origins of Totalitarianism (1951); The Human Condition (1958)Totalitarianism (Nazism, Stalinism) is a genuinely new form of domination, distinct from older tyranny, that atomises individuals and destroys the public realm of plural, meaningful political action; distinguishes 'labour', 'work' and 'action' as three basic human activities, with action — free speech and deeds among equals in a public space — as the highest, most distinctively political.
Frantz FanonThe Wretched of the Earth (1961); Black Skin, White Masks (1952)Colonialism is a Manichean, violent structure (the coloniser's world and the colonised's world are physically and psychologically separated) that inflicts a deep psychological alienation on the colonised; genuine decolonization, he argues, is itself necessarily a violent process because colonial power was itself established and is maintained by violence, and only this reclaims the colonised's own agency and humanity.
Mao ZedongOn Contradiction (1937); On New Democracy (1940)Adapts Marxism to a largely agrarian, pre-industrial society by making the peasantry (not the urban industrial proletariat, which barely existed) the primary revolutionary class, organised through a protracted people's war of encircling cities from the countryside; distinguishes 'antagonistic' contradictions (with class enemies) from 'non-antagonistic' ones (among the people) requiring different methods of resolution.
John RawlsA Theory of Justice (1971)The veil of ignorance, the original position, and the two principles of justice (liberty principle; difference principle plus fair equality of opportunity) — the full framework already met in chapter 1's justice section, restated here as this list's own closing, most-recent name.
ℹ️ Why these sixteen, read as one list
Read chronologically the list traces political thought's own arc: virtue and the ideal state (Confucius, Plato, Aristotle) → the break into realist statecraft (Machiavelli) → contractarian and idealist foundations of the modern state (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel) → liberal reform and its socialist critique (Wollstonecraft, Mill, Marx, Gramsci) → twentieth-century responses to totalitarianism, colonialism, agrarian revolution and liberal justice (Arendt, Fanon, Mao, Rawls). Holding this arc in mind is what turns sixteen memorised names into an answerable exam.

Key takeaways

  • Confucius grounds order in ruler's virtue (ren, li), not law; Plato's Republic makes justice a mirror of the tripartite soul ruled by philosopher-kings; Aristotle's Politics classifies constitutions and favours a middle-class 'polity'; Machiavelli's Prince separates statecraft from conventional morality.
  • Hobbes's absolute sovereign ends a brutish war of all against all; Locke's limited, trust-bound government preserves a right of revolution; Rousseau's general will replaces private wills with the common good; Hegel's state actualises ethical life beyond family and civil society.
  • Wollstonecraft argues women's apparent inferiority is produced by education, not nature; Mill's harm principle limits legitimate interference to preventing harm to others; Marx calls the capitalist state a committee managing bourgeois affairs; Gramsci's organic intellectual articulates a class's own worldview.
  • Arendt distinguishes totalitarianism from older tyranny and prizes public 'action'; Fanon argues colonialism's violence requires a violent decolonization to restore agency; Mao adapts Marxism around peasant revolution and distinguishes antagonistic from non-antagonistic contradictions; Rawls's veil of ignorance yields the liberty and difference principles.
  • Read as one chronological arc — ideal state, statecraft, social contract, liberal-socialist reform, twentieth-century response — the sixteen names become a single narrative rather than sixteen isolated facts.

Practice questions (17)

Attempt each one before opening the answer. Every explanation names the tempting wrong option as well as the right one, because that is where marks are lost.

  1. Confucius's Analects locate good government chiefly in:

    1. The ruler's own virtue and ritual propriety
    2. Strict law and harsh punishment
    3. A social contract among equals
    4. Class struggle between owners and labourers
    Show answer

    Answer: A — The ruler's own virtue and ritual propriety

    Confucian rule-by-virtue (ren, li) is explicitly opposed to the rival Legalist emphasis on law and punishment; contract and class-struggle belong to entirely different, much later traditions.
  2. In Plato's Republic, rule belongs properly to:

    1. Philosopher-kings who grasp the Form of the Good
    2. The propertied middle class
    3. An elected assembly of citizens
    4. The organic intellectual of the working class
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Philosopher-kings who grasp the Form of the Good

    Plato's tripartite state reserves rule to the guardian/philosopher-ruler class alone; the propertied middle class is Aristotle's preferred base for a stable 'polity', and the organic intellectual is Gramsci's concept.
  3. Aristotle's Politics classifies a constitution as corrupt when rule serves:

    1. The ruler's own interest rather than the common good
    2. The middle class exclusively
    3. A written, codified law
    4. A hereditary aristocracy alone
    Show answer

    Answer: A — The ruler's own interest rather than the common good

    Aristotle's own distinction is common-good rule (monarchy, aristocracy, polity) against self-interested, corrupt rule (tyranny, oligarchy, his sense of democracy) — not simply which class rules.
  4. Machiavelli's 'The Prince' (1513) advises a ruler to combine the qualities of:

    1. The lion (force) and the fox (cunning)
    2. Guardian and producer
    3. Labour and action
    4. Ren and li
    Show answer

    Answer: A — The lion (force) and the fox (cunning)

    The lion-and-fox pairing is Machiavelli's own image; the other pairs belong to Plato, Arendt and Confucius respectively.
  5. In Hobbes's Leviathan, the social contract creates:

    1. An absolute, indivisible sovereign with no right of rebellion against it
    2. A limited government bound by a revocable trust
    3. A general will each citizen obeys as obeying themselves
    4. An ethical life reconciling family and civil society
    Show answer

    Answer: A — An absolute, indivisible sovereign with no right of rebellion against it

    Hobbes's contract is a one-way, irrevocable surrender to an absolute sovereign in exchange for peace; the other options describe Locke, Rousseau and Hegel respectively.
  6. John Locke's 'Two Treatises of Government' grounds the people's right of revolution in:

    1. A breach of the trust reposed in government
    2. The dialectical unfolding of Spirit
    3. Class contradictions in capitalism
    4. The war of all against all
    Show answer

    Answer: A — A breach of the trust reposed in government

    Locke's government holds only entrusted power; breaching that trust revives the people's right of revolution — the other options belong to Hegel, Marx and Hobbes.
  7. Rousseau's general will (volonté générale) is best described as:

    1. The common good the community wills, not the mere sum of private wills
    2. The sovereign's absolute, irrevocable power
    3. A trust the government must not breach
    4. A capitalist state managing bourgeois affairs
    Show answer

    Answer: A — The common good the community wills, not the mere sum of private wills

    This is Rousseau's own definition, distinct from the mere aggregate 'will of all'; the other options describe Hobbes, Locke and Marx.
  8. Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' (1821) sees the state as:

    1. The actualisation of ethical life, beyond family and civil society
    2. A device individuals construct to protect pre-existing natural rights
    3. A committee managing the bourgeoisie's common affairs
    4. An arrangement selected through competitive elections
    Show answer

    Answer: A — The actualisation of ethical life, beyond family and civil society

    Hegel breaks from social-contract individualism entirely — the state is Sittlichkeit's highest stage, not a protective device (Locke) or class instrument (Marx) or electoral method (Schumpeter).
  9. Mary Wollstonecraft's 'A Vindication of the Rights of Woman' (1792) argues that women's apparent inferiority arises from:

    1. An education that trains them for ornamental dependence
    2. Their exclusion from the general will
    3. Nature itself
    4. Colonial violence
    Show answer

    Answer: A — An education that trains them for ornamental dependence

    Wollstonecraft's whole argument is that nature is not the cause — a deficient education is, which is why the remedy is equal rational education, not a claim about natural fact.
  10. J.S. Mill's harm principle in 'On Liberty' (1859) permits society to interfere with an individual's liberty only to:

    1. Prevent harm to others
    2. Promote the individual's own good
    3. Enforce ritual propriety
    4. Maintain the state through necessity
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Prevent harm to others

    Mill explicitly rules out mere paternalism ('for his own good') as a legitimate ground — only harm to others justifies interference.
  11. Mill's 'Considerations on Representative Government' worries chiefly about:

    1. A 'tyranny of the majority' crushing minority opinion
    2. The war of all against all
    3. The organic intellectual's role
    4. Antagonistic versus non-antagonistic contradictions
    Show answer

    Answer: A — A 'tyranny of the majority' crushing minority opinion

    This is Mill's own stated worry about representative democracy, which leads him to defend plural voting as a partial safeguard; the other options belong to Hobbes, Gramsci and Mao.
  12. Marx and Engels describe the capitalist state, in 'The Communist Manifesto', as:

    1. A committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie
    2. A neutral arbiter above class interest
    3. The actualisation of ethical life
    4. A trust that can be revoked by the people
    Show answer

    Answer: A — A committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie

    This is the Manifesto's own famous phrase, directly denying the state's neutrality — the opposite of Hegel's ethical-life account and Locke's revocable-trust account.
  13. Gramsci's 'organic intellectual', unlike a 'traditional intellectual', is defined by:

    1. Being drawn from and articulating a particular class's own worldview
    2. Standing as an autonomous, class-neutral observer
    3. Belonging to the guardian class of a Platonic republic
    4. Defending plural voting for the educated
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Being drawn from and articulating a particular class's own worldview

    The organic intellectual is class-rooted by definition, exactly the opposite of the self-styled 'autonomous' traditional intellectual Gramsci contrasts it with.
  14. Hannah Arendt's 'The Origins of Totalitarianism' (1951) argues that totalitarian regimes are distinguished by:

    1. Atomising individuals and destroying the public realm of plural political action
    2. A protracted people's war from the countryside
    3. A veil of ignorance behind the original position
    4. A Manichean division between coloniser and colonised
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Atomising individuals and destroying the public realm of plural political action

    Arendt's specific claim is about the destruction of the public/political realm as a genuinely new form of domination; the other options belong to Mao, Rawls and Fanon respectively.
  15. Frantz Fanon's 'The Wretched of the Earth' (1961) argues that decolonization must itself be:

    1. A violent process, because colonial power was established and maintained by violence
    2. A gradual, parliamentary reform
    3. Guided by philosopher-kings
    4. Resolved through non-antagonistic contradiction
    Show answer

    Answer: A — A violent process, because colonial power was established and maintained by violence

    Fanon's specific and often-tested claim is that decolonization mirrors colonialism's own violence; gradual reform is closer to Bernstein's revisionism, and 'non-antagonistic contradiction' is Mao's distinct category for disputes among the people.
  16. Mao Zedong's adaptation of Marxism to China made the primary revolutionary class:

    1. The peasantry
    2. The urban industrial proletariat
    3. Organic intellectuals
    4. The educated middle class
    Show answer

    Answer: A — The peasantry

    Because China had barely any industrial proletariat, Mao made the peasantry, organised through protracted people's war, the primary revolutionary agent — a specific departure from orthodox Marxism.
  17. John Rawls's 'original position', behind the 'veil of ignorance', is a device for:

    1. Choosing principles of justice while ignorant of one's own place in society
    2. Distinguishing labour, work and action
    3. Adapting Marxism to a peasant society
    4. Establishing an organic intellectual's authority
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Choosing principles of justice while ignorant of one's own place in society

    This is precisely Rawls's own device from 'A Theory of Justice' (1971); the other options belong to Arendt, Mao and Gramsci.