"A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community" is the maxim of:

Peter Singer's animal liberation

The "Collingridge dilemma" in the evaluation of technology states that:

A technology is easy to change when its effects are unknown and hard to change once they are known

Technology is a neutral instrument

Every technology has unintended benefits that outweigh its harms

Lack of certainty should never delay regulation

A technology is easy to change when its effects are unknown and hard to change once they are known

Langdon Winner's "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" argues chiefly that:

Technical designs can embody social arrangements and relations of power

Only the uses of technology, never its design, raise political questions

Technical designs can embody social arrangements and relations of power

Technology is autonomous and beyond human control

Technology reveals nature as standing-reserve

Assertion (A): Peter Singer holds that the suffering of animals must be given equal consideration with similar human suffering. Reason (R): Singer holds that animals possess inviolable natural rights that may never be overridden by considerations of utility. Choose the correct option.

Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A

Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A

Which of the following are non-anthropocentric positions in environmental ethics? Select all that apply.

Conservation of forests solely for future human timber supply

Applied Philosophy I: Philosophy of Technology, the Ethics of New Technologies and Environmental Ethics

Unit 10, "Applied Philosophy", asks first what applied philosophy is, then for the philosophy of technology (technology, dominance, power and social inequalities; the democratisation of technology; the public evaluation of science and technology), the ethical implications of information technology, biotechnology and, as the syllabus prints it, "non-technology", and environmental ethics with Aldo Leopold's land ethic, Arne Naess's deep ecology and Peter Singer on animals. "Non-technology" is an evident misprint for nanotechnology, which is the third of the new technologies routinely paired with information technology and biotechnology, and the chapter treats it so. Positions on contested questions are set out with their arguments, not adjudicated.

1. What is applied philosophy?

Applied philosophy uses the methods of philosophy, conceptual analysis, argument and the examination of assumptions, on questions of practical importance: medicine, technology, the environment, business, the media and law. It became an organised field from the 1970s (the Society for Applied Philosophy was founded in Britain in 1982, with its Journal of Applied Philosophy), though philosophers from Socrates and Kauṭilya onward had addressed practical questions. It is wider than applied ethics: questions about the concept of death in medicine, the nature of risk, what counts as evidence in a court or what a "person" is draw on metaphysics and epistemology as much as on ethics.

🎯 Three ways to apply theory

A "top-down" approach deduces verdicts from a general theory such as utilitarianism or Kantian ethics. A "bottom-up" approach, casuistry, reasons from paradigm cases by analogy. A middle path, used in Beauchamp and Childress's principlism and in Rawls's reflective equilibrium, moves between mid-level principles and considered judgements about cases. Much debate in applied philosophy is about which of these methods is appropriate.

2. Philosophy of technology: dominance, power, democratisation and public evaluation

The instrumental view treats technology as a neutral tool, good or bad according to use. Philosophers of technology have challenged this from several directions. Heidegger (Chapter 19) saw modern technology as a way of revealing that turns everything into standing-reserve. Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society (1954) described "technique" as an autonomous force that shapes society to its demands for efficiency. Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man (1964) argued that technological rationality becomes a form of domination, integrating people into the system by satisfying manufactured needs. Gandhi's Hind Swaraj criticised machinery for concentrating wealth and displacing labour.

Technology, power and inequality: Langdon Winner's "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" (1980) argued that technologies can embody social arrangements. His best-known example, the low overpasses Robert Moses built on Long Island parkways, which kept buses and so poorer people off roads to public beaches, is contested as history, but the general point is widely accepted: design choices can build in exclusion. The digital divide, unequal access to computers and the internet, shows how a new technology can deepen existing inequalities.
Democratisation of technology: Andrew Feenberg's critical theory of technology (Critical Theory of Technology, 1991; Transforming Technology, 2002) holds that technology is neither neutral nor autonomous but socially shaped, and so open to "democratic rationalisation", in which users and affected publics take part in design. Related ideas include E. F. Schumacher's "intermediate" or appropriate technology (Small Is Beautiful, 1973), participatory design and citizen panels.
Public evaluation of science and technology: technology assessment (the United States Office of Technology Assessment, 1972–1995; Danish consensus conferences from 1987) tries to anticipate the effects of a technology before it spreads. David Collingridge's dilemma (1980) states the difficulty: early on, a technology is easy to change but its effects are unknown; once the effects are known, it is entrenched and hard to change. The precautionary principle (Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, 1992) says that lack of full scientific certainty should not postpone cost-effective measures against serious or irreversible harm, and Ulrich Beck's Risk Society (1986) describes modern societies as increasingly organised around risks they themselves produce.

3. The ethics of information technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology

Ethical issues of three new technologies
Technology	Main issues	Philosophical frames
Information technology	Privacy and surveillance, ownership of data and software, the digital divide, cyber-security, misinformation, algorithmic bias and the accountability of automated and AI systems	James Moor's "What is Computer Ethics?" (1985): computers create "policy vacuums" that ethics must fill; Luciano Floridi's information ethics
Biotechnology	Genetically modified crops, cloning (Dolly the sheep, 1996), gene editing (CRISPR), genetic testing and screening, enhancement against therapy, patenting of life forms and biopiracy	Habermas (The Future of Human Nature, 2001) on genetic design and autonomy; Sandel (The Case against Perfection, 2007) on giftedness; the "playing God" objection and replies
Nanotechnology (the syllabus's "non-technology")	Unknown toxicity of nanoparticles to health and environment, regulation under uncertainty, surveillance through invisible sensors, military uses, equitable distribution of benefits, and speculative risks such as Eric Drexler's self-replicating "grey goo" (Engines of Creation, 1986)	The precautionary principle and the Collingridge dilemma apply with special force, since the technology is new and its effects largely unknown

ℹ️ Why "non-technology" is read as nanotechnology

The item reads "Ethical Implication of information technology, bio-technology, non-technology". "Non-technology" has no established meaning in applied ethics, while information technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology are the standard triad of emerging technologies in the literature. The word is an evident misprint, and questions set from this item can be expected to concern nanotechnology.

4. Environmental ethics: nature as means or end, Leopold, Naess and Singer

The central question is whether nature has only instrumental value, as a means to human ends (anthropocentrism), or also intrinsic value, as an end in itself (non-anthropocentrism). Lynn White Jr.'s "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis" (1967) blamed the crisis on a Western attitude of dominion over nature. Non-anthropocentric theories extend moral standing in widening circles: to sentient animals (sentientism), to all living things (biocentrism, as in Albert Schweitzer's reverence for life or Paul Taylor's respect for nature) and to ecosystems and the biotic community as wholes (ecocentrism).

Aldo Leopold's land ethic (A Sand County Almanac, 1949) enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants and animals, "or collectively: the land", and changes the role of Homo sapiens "from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it". Its maxim: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." The essay "Thinking Like a Mountain" recounts how killing wolves led to overgrazed slopes.
Arne Naess's deep ecology ("The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement", 1973) contrasts "shallow" ecology, which fights pollution and resource depletion for the health and affluence of people in developed countries, with a deep movement that recognises the intrinsic value of all life. The eight-point platform he drew up with George Sessions (1984) begins with the claim that the flourishing of human and non-human life has value in itself, independent of usefulness for human purposes; Naess's own "ecosophy T" centres on Self-realisation, the widening identification of the self with all beings, and "biospherical egalitarianism in principle".
Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (1975) argues from the principle of equal consideration of interests. The capacity to suffer is the prerequisite for having interests at all, as Bentham saw: "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" Giving less weight to the similar suffering of a being because it belongs to another species is "speciesism", a term coined by Richard Ryder in 1970, and is as indefensible as racism or sexism. Singer's case against factory farming and much animal experimentation is utilitarian: he does not rest it on rights. The rights-based view is Tom Regan's (The Case for Animal Rights, 1983): animals that are "subjects-of-a-life" have inherent value and rights that may not be overridden for aggregate benefit.

⚠️ Singer does not argue from rights

The syllabus lists "Peter Singer; Animal Rights". Singer is the founding figure of the modern animal movement, but his argument is utilitarian (equal consideration of interests), and he uses "rights" only as a convenient shorthand. A statement that Singer grounds animal liberation in inviolable natural rights is false; that view belongs to Tom Regan.

Key takeaways

Applied philosophy brings conceptual analysis and argument to practical questions and is wider than applied ethics; its methods range from top-down theory to casuistry, with principlism and reflective equilibrium between.
Philosophy of technology: against neutrality, Ellul (autonomous technique), Marcuse (technological rationality as domination), Winner (artifacts have politics); Feenberg's democratic rationalisation; Schumacher's appropriate technology.
Public evaluation: technology assessment, the Collingridge dilemma, the precautionary principle (Rio 1992, Principle 15), Beck's risk society. IT: privacy, data, digital divide, algorithmic bias (Moor's policy vacuums).
Biotechnology: GM crops, cloning, gene editing, enhancement and therapy (Habermas, Sandel); the syllabus's "non-technology" is an evident misprint for nanotechnology: toxicity, uncertainty, surveillance, precaution.
Environmental ethics: anthropocentrism against intrinsic value; Leopold's land ethic ("integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community"); Naess's deep ecology (1973; eight-point platform, 1984); Singer's equal consideration and speciesism (utilitarian), Regan's animal rights.

Practice questions (10)

Attempt each one before opening the answer. Every explanation names the tempting wrong option as well as the right one, because that is where marks are lost.

"A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community" is the maxim of:
1. Aldo Leopold's land ethic
2. Peter Singer's animal liberation
3. Albert Schweitzer's reverence for life
4. Arne Naess's deep ecology
Show answer
Answer: A — Aldo Leopold's land ethic
The maxim is from "The Land Ethic" in Leopold's A Sand County Almanac (1949). Its holism, valuing the biotic community as a whole, distinguishes it from Singer's focus on individual sentient beings and Schweitzer's on individual living things.
The distinction between "shallow" and "deep" ecology was introduced in 1973 by:
1. Lynn White Jr.
2. Aldo Leopold
3. Arne Naess
4. Tom Regan
Show answer
Answer: C — Arne Naess
Naess's paper "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement" (1973) introduced it. Leopold died in 1948, White wrote on the historical roots of the ecological crisis (1967), and Regan defended animal rights.
The "Collingridge dilemma" in the evaluation of technology states that:
1. Technology is a neutral instrument
2. Every technology has unintended benefits that outweigh its harms
3. Lack of certainty should never delay regulation
4. A technology is easy to change when its effects are unknown and hard to change once they are known
Show answer
Answer: D — A technology is easy to change when its effects are unknown and hard to change once they are known
David Collingridge (The Social Control of Technology, 1980) identified the information and power problem of controlling technology. The last option resembles the precautionary principle, a different idea; the neutrality thesis is what philosophers of technology criticise.
The term "speciesism" was coined by:
1. Jeremy Bentham
2. Tom Regan
3. Richard Ryder
4. Peter Singer
Show answer
Answer: C — Richard Ryder
Richard Ryder coined "speciesism" in 1970; Peter Singer made it famous in Animal Liberation (1975). Bentham asked "Can they suffer?", and Regan defended animal rights.
Langdon Winner's "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" argues chiefly that:
1. Only the uses of technology, never its design, raise political questions
2. Technical designs can embody social arrangements and relations of power
3. Technology is autonomous and beyond human control
4. Technology reveals nature as standing-reserve
Show answer
Answer: B — Technical designs can embody social arrangements and relations of power
Winner argues that artifacts can settle political questions through their design, as in his (historically contested) example of low parkway bridges. Autonomous technique is Ellul's thesis, standing-reserve Heidegger's, and the third option is the neutrality view Winner rejects.
Assertion (A): Peter Singer holds that the suffering of animals must be given equal consideration with similar human suffering. Reason (R): Singer holds that animals possess inviolable natural rights that may never be overridden by considerations of utility. Choose the correct option.
1. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
2. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
3. A is true, but R is false
4. A is false, but R is true
Show answer
Answer: C — A is true, but R is false
A is true: this is the principle of equal consideration of interests, with sentience as the criterion. R is false: Singer's argument is utilitarian; the inviolable-rights view is Tom Regan's.
Assertion (A): The syllabus item "non-technology" is best read as nanotechnology. Reason (R): Information technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology form the standard triad of emerging technologies in applied ethics. Choose the correct option.
1. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
2. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
3. A is true, but R is false
4. A is false, but R is true
Show answer
Answer: A — Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
Both are true and R explains A: "non-technology" has no established sense, and the item lists it after information technology and biotechnology, the usual companions of nanotechnology, so the reading as an evident misprint is the natural one.
Which of the following are non-anthropocentric positions in environmental ethics? Select all that apply.
1. Leopold's land ethic
2. Naess's deep ecology
3. Schweitzer's reverence for life
4. Conservation of forests solely for future human timber supply
Show answer
Answer: A — Leopold's land ethic; B — Naess's deep ecology; C — Schweitzer's reverence for life
The land ethic (ecocentric), deep ecology and reverence for life (biocentric) all ascribe value to nature beyond its use for humans. Conserving forests only for future timber treats nature purely as a means to human ends, which is anthropocentric.
Which of the following thinkers reject the view that technology is a neutral instrument? Select all that apply.
1. Herbert Marcuse
2. Jacques Ellul
3. Karl Jaspers
4. Langdon Winner
Show answer
Answer: A — Herbert Marcuse; B — Jacques Ellul; D — Langdon Winner
Ellul (autonomous technique), Marcuse (technological rationality as domination) and Winner (artifacts have politics) all reject neutrality. Karl Jaspers is the standard example of the instrumental view: in The Origin and Goal of History (1949) he wrote that technology is only a means, in itself neither good nor evil, and that everything depends on what man makes of it.
In which year was Peter Singer's Animal Liberation first published? Type the year.
Numerical answer — type the value.
Show answer
Answer: 1975
1975. The book applied the principle of equal consideration of interests to animals and popularised Richard Ryder's term "speciesism" (1970).