Classical Indian Philosophy V: The Schools of Vedānta

All five Vedānta schools in the syllabus interpret the same three sources, the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad Gītā and Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma Sūtra, and they divide over one question: how is Brahman related to the individual self and the world? Advaita (Śaṅkara) answers with identity and appearance; Viśiṣṭādvaita (Rāmānuja) with a qualified unity of a whole and its inseparable parts; Dvaita (Madhva) with fivefold difference; Dvaitādvaita (Nimbārka) with natural difference-in-identity; and Śuddhādvaita (Vallabha) with a pure non-duality in which the world is a real, unchanging manifestation. The syllabus prints "Anirvachniya-khyāti", "Dvaitavaita", "Sudhadvaita" and "Jñānaswaroop" (the last with a Greek letter for ñ in the extracted text); the correct forms are anirvacanīya-khyāti, Dvaitādvaita, Śuddhādvaita and jñānasvarūpa. Its entry for Dvaitādvaita ends "kinds of inanimate", which refers to Nimbārka's three kinds of non-conscious reality.

1. Advaita: Brahman, māyā, adhyāsa and the grades of reality

For Śaṅkara (8th century) Brahman is nirguṇa: without attributes, without internal difference, pure being, consciousness and bliss. The individual self (jīva) is Brahman itself as it appears limited by the adjuncts (upādhi) of body and mind; the post-Śaṅkara schools explain the limitation either as a reflection of consciousness in ignorance (pratibimbavāda, the Vivaraṇa school) or as a delimitation like space in a pot (avacchedavāda, Vācaspati's Bhāmatī school). Liberation is the knowledge that "tat tvam asi" is literally true, and it can be attained while living (jīvanmukti).

The three grades of sattā (reality)
GradeWhat has itSublated by
Pāramārthika (absolute)Brahman aloneNothing; it is never sublated
Vyāvahārika (empirical)The world of ordinary experience, jīvas and ĪśvaraKnowledge of Brahman
Prātibhāsika (apparent)Illusions and dreams: the snake in the rope, silver in the shellOrdinary waking correction

Adhyāsa (superimposition) is defined in the preface to Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra commentary as "the apparent presentation, in the form of memory, of something previously observed, in some other thing" (smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭa-avabhāsaḥ). The root superimposition is the mutual one of self and not-self: the self's consciousness is attributed to the body and mind, and their properties ("I am fat", "I am unhappy") to the self. Māyā (or avidyā) is the cause of this: beginningless, positive in character (bhāva-rūpa), indescribable as either real or unreal, and removable by knowledge. It has two powers, āvaraṇa (concealing the real) and vikṣepa (projecting the world).

  • Vivartavāda: the world is an apparent transformation (vivarta) of Brahman, as the rope appears as a snake without itself changing. Contrast pariṇāma, real transformation, as milk becomes curd, which Sāṃkhya and the theistic Vedāntas accept.
  • Anirvacanīya-khyāti: the snake seen in the rope is not real (sat), since it is sublated; not unreal (asat), since it is actually seen, unlike a hare's horn; and not both, since that is contradictory. It is indescribable (anirvacanīya), a temporary product of ignorance. The world has the same status at the vyāvahārika level.

2. Viśiṣṭādvaita: Rāmānuja's qualified non-dualism

Rāmānuja (traditionally 1017–1137; Śrībhāṣya, Vedārthasaṅgraha) holds that Brahman is saguṇa, the personal God Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, possessed of infinite auspicious qualities. Brahman is one, but it is a unity qualified (viśiṣṭa) by two real modes: conscious selves (cit) and non-conscious matter (acit). These are related to Brahman as body to soul (śarīra–śarīrī): they exist only for, in and through Brahman, which controls and sustains them. The relation is apṛthaksiddhi, "inseparability": a mode cannot exist or be known apart from the substance it qualifies, as a colour cannot exist apart from a thing. Rāmānuja uses apṛthaksiddhi in place of the Nyāya samavāya, which he rejects as leading to regress.

Rāmānuja's refutation of māyā is summarised as seven untenabilities (sapta-vidha anupapatti) of Advaita's avidyā: it has no possible locus (āśraya), since Brahman is pure knowledge and the jīva is its product; it cannot conceal (tirodhāna) self-luminous Brahman; its nature (svarūpa) cannot be positive or negative; "indescribable" (anirvacanīya) is incoherent, since everything must be either existent or non-existent; there is no means of knowing it (pramāṇa); nothing can remove it (nivartaka), since knowledge of a featureless Brahman is impossible; and its removal (nivṛtti) is inexplicable if it is beginningless and positive.

  • Brahma-pariṇāmavāda: creation is a real transformation of Brahman's body from a subtle causal state (kāraṇa-avasthā) to a gross effect state (kārya-avasthā); Brahman as soul remains unchanged, so its perfection is untouched by the world's change.
  • Jīva: atomic in size, eternal, a real knower and agent, a part (aṃśa) of Brahman and many in number; souls are bound (baddha), liberated (mukta) or eternally free (nitya). In liberation the soul becomes like Brahman but does not become Brahman.
  • Bhakti and prapatti: the means to liberation is bhakti, loving meditation grounded in knowledge and works; prapatti (śaraṇāgati), total surrender to God's grace, is open to all irrespective of caste or learning.
  • Satkhyāti: all cognition is of the real (yathārthaṃ sarva-vijñānam). In shell-silver, by the doctrine that every element contains portions of every other (trivṛtkaraṇa), silver-particles really are in the shell; the error is only in taking a minor part for the whole.

3. Dvaita: Madhva's realism of difference

Madhva (13th century; commentaries on the Brahma Sūtra, the Anuvyākhyāna) rejects both nirguṇa Brahman and māyā. Brahman is Viṣṇu, the only independent (svatantra) reality, full of qualities; everything else, souls and matter, is real but dependent (paratantra). A Brahman without qualities could not be known or worshipped and would contradict the scriptures that praise God's attributes; the world is not illusory, because it is known by valid perception and never sublated. Difference (bheda) is the very nature (svarūpa) of each thing, and is fivefold.

Pañca-bheda: the five differences
No.Difference between
1God and soul (īśa–jīva)
2God and matter (īśa–jaḍa)
3Soul and soul (jīva–jīva)
4Soul and matter (jīva–jaḍa)
5Matter and matter (jaḍa–jaḍa)

Sākṣī, the witness, is in Madhva the self's own intuitive faculty of knowledge. It directly apprehends the self, its states (pleasure, pain), time and space, and it apprehends the validity of other cognitions, which is why Madhva holds validity to be intrinsic (svataḥ). Whatever the sākṣī grasps is beyond doubt. Souls are graded (tāratamya) even in liberation, and Madhva is unusual among Indian thinkers in holding that some souls are eternally unfit for liberation. The path is bhakti grounded in knowledge of God's supremacy and one's own dependence, made fruitful by God's grace.

4. Dvaitādvaita (Nimbārka) and Śuddhādvaita (Vallabha)

Nimbārka (commonly placed in the 12th or 13th century; Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, Daśaślokī) teaches svābhāvika bhedābheda, natural difference-and-non-difference. Souls and the world are different from Brahman (Kṛṣṇa, with Rādhā) in that they are dependent and limited, and non-different in that they have no existence apart from him, as the sun's rays are both other than the sun and nothing but the sun. On the syllabus's two items: the soul is jñānasvarūpa, of the nature of knowledge, and at the same time a knower (jñātā), as the sun is both light and the source of light; and the non-conscious (acit) is of three kinds, aprākṛta (not derived from prakṛti, the stuff of the divine realm), prākṛta (derived from prakṛti and made of the three guṇas) and kāla (time), as Daśaślokī 3 states.

Vallabha (1479–1531; Aṇubhāṣya, founder of the Puṣṭimārga) calls his system Śuddhādvaita, pure non-dualism: Brahman is pure, untouched by māyā, and the world is Brahman itself. His key concept is avikṛta-pariṇāmavāda, transformation without modification: Brahman truly becomes the world, as gold becomes ornaments, but Brahman itself undergoes no change or loss. The world (jagat) is therefore real; what is false is saṃsāra, the network of "I" and "mine" that ignorance builds on it. Souls are parts of Brahman that issue from it like sparks from a fire, and liberation comes through God's grace (puṣṭi) and devotion to Kṛṣṇa.

The five schools compared
SchoolFounderBrahmanWorldKey term
AdvaitaŚaṅkaraNirguṇaVivarta (appearance)Anirvacanīya-khyāti
ViśiṣṭādvaitaRāmānujaSaguṇa, with cit and acit as bodyReal pariṇāma of Brahman's bodyApṛthaksiddhi; satkhyāti
DvaitaMadhvaViṣṇu, the only independent realityReal, dependent, eternally distinctPañca-bheda; sākṣī
DvaitādvaitaNimbārkaKṛṣṇa with RādhāDifferent and non-differentSvābhāvika bhedābheda
ŚuddhādvaitaVallabhaPure, untouched by māyāReal manifestation without change in BrahmanAvikṛta-pariṇāmavāda; puṣṭi
⚠️ Pariṇāma and avikṛta-pariṇāma are not the same
Rāmānuja's Brahma-pariṇāmavāda and Vallabha's avikṛta-pariṇāmavāda both make the world real, but Rāmānuja locates the change in Brahman's body (cit and acit) while Vallabha denies any change in Brahman at all. Śaṅkara's vivarta denies that there is any real change. A question naming "avikṛta" wants Vallabha.

Key takeaways

  • Advaita: nirguṇa Brahman identical with Ātman; three grades of sattā (pāramārthika, vyāvahārika, prātibhāsika); adhyāsa as "smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭa-avabhāsaḥ"; māyā with āvaraṇa and vikṣepa; vivarta; anirvacanīya-khyāti.
  • Viśiṣṭādvaita: saguṇa Brahman with cit and acit as its body; apṛthaksiddhi; seven anupapattis against māyā; Brahma-pariṇāmavāda; atomic, many jīvas; bhakti and prapatti; satkhyāti.
  • Dvaita: Viṣṇu alone svatantra; rejection of nirguṇa Brahman and māyā; five differences; the sākṣī as intuitive, self-validating knowledge; gradation of souls; bhakti.
  • Dvaitādvaita: svābhāvika bhedābheda; the soul as jñānasvarūpa and knower; three kinds of acit, aprākṛta, prākṛta and kāla.
  • Śuddhādvaita: Brahman untouched by māyā; avikṛta-pariṇāmavāda (the world is Brahman's real manifestation without change in it); jagat real, saṃsāra false; puṣṭi.

Practice questions (10)

Attempt each one before opening the answer. Every explanation names the tempting wrong option as well as the right one, because that is where marks are lost.

  1. Avikṛta-pariṇāmavāda, the view that Brahman becomes the world without undergoing any change, is associated with:

    1. Madhva
    2. Śaṅkara
    3. Rāmānuja
    4. Vallabha
    Show answer

    Answer: D — Vallabha

    Vallabha's Śuddhādvaita holds avikṛta-pariṇāma. Rāmānuja holds a real transformation of Brahman's body (Brahma-pariṇāma), Madhva an eternally distinct dependent world, and Śaṅkara vivarta, apparent transformation.

  2. In Advaita, the snake seen in a rope belongs to which grade of reality?

    1. Pāramārthika
    2. Vyāvahārika
    3. Prātibhāsika
    4. Tuccha (the utterly unreal, like a hare's horn)
    Show answer

    Answer: C — Prātibhāsika

    Illusions and dreams are prātibhāsika: they are sublated by ordinary waking experience. The empirical world is vyāvahārika and Brahman pāramārthika. The tuccha, like a hare's horn, never even appears, whereas the snake does appear.

  3. Apṛthaksiddhi, the relation of inseparability between substance and mode, is a key concept of:

    1. Madhva
    2. Rāmānuja
    3. Vallabha
    4. Nimbārka
    Show answer

    Answer: B — Rāmānuja

    Rāmānuja uses apṛthaksiddhi for the relation of cit and acit to Brahman, as body to soul, in place of the Nyāya samavāya. Madhva's key terms are pañca-bheda and sākṣī, Nimbārka's svābhāvika bhedābheda, and Vallabha's avikṛta-pariṇāma.

  4. According to Nimbārka, the non-conscious (acit) is of three kinds. Which set is correct?

    1. Aprākṛta, prākṛta and kāla
    2. Baddha, mukta and nitya
    3. Sattva, rajas and tamas
    4. Pāramārthika, vyāvahārika and prātibhāsika
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Aprākṛta, prākṛta and kāla

    Daśaślokī 3 divides acit into aprākṛta (non-material, the divine realm), prākṛta (made of prakṛti) and kāla (time). The guṇas are Sāṃkhya's constituents, the three grades of reality are Advaita's, and bound, liberated and eternal are classes of souls.

  5. Śaṅkara defines adhyāsa as:

    1. The non-apprehension of the difference between perception and memory
    2. The inseparable relation of a mode to its substance
    3. The apparent presentation, in the form of memory, of something previously observed, in some other thing
    4. The real transformation of a cause into its effect
    Show answer

    Answer: C — The apparent presentation, in the form of memory, of something previously observed, in some other thing

    "Smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭa-avabhāsaḥ" opens Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra commentary. Non-apprehension of difference is Prabhākara's akhyāti, real transformation is pariṇāma, and inseparability is Rāmānuja's apṛthaksiddhi.

  6. Assertion (A): Advaita holds that the world is vivarta of Brahman. Reason (R): In vivarta the cause appears as the effect without itself undergoing any real change. Choose the correct option.

    1. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
    2. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
    3. A is true, but R is false
    4. A is false, but R is true
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A

    Both are true and R explains A. Śaṅkara calls the world vivarta precisely because Brahman, like the rope that looks like a snake, appears as the world without changing, so its non-duality and changelessness are preserved.

  7. Assertion (A): Madhva holds that the validity of knowledge is intrinsic (svataḥ). Reason (R): For Madhva, Brahman is nirguṇa and the world is an appearance of māyā. Choose the correct option.

    1. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
    2. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
    3. A is true, but R is false
    4. A is false, but R is true
    Show answer

    Answer: C — A is true, but R is false

    A is true: the sākṣī apprehends the validity of cognitions directly, so validity is svataḥ. R is false: Madhva rejects both nirguṇa Brahman and māyā; that is Advaita's position.

  8. Which of the following are among the seven untenabilities (anupapatti) Rāmānuja raises against Advaita's avidyā? Select all that apply.

    1. Nivartaka-anupapatti (nothing can remove it)
    2. Vyāpti-anupapatti (no universal concomitance)
    3. Āśraya-anupapatti (no possible locus)
    4. Tirodhāna-anupapatti (it cannot conceal Brahman)
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Nivartaka-anupapatti (nothing can remove it); C — Āśraya-anupapatti (no possible locus); D — Tirodhāna-anupapatti (it cannot conceal Brahman)

    The seven are āśraya, tirodhāna, svarūpa, anirvacanīyatva, pramāṇa, nivartaka and nivṛtti. "Vyāpti-anupapatti" is not one of them; vyāpti belongs to the theory of inference.

  9. Which of the following accept that the world is real (not an appearance of māyā)? Select all that apply.

    1. Madhva
    2. Rāmānuja
    3. Śaṅkara
    4. Vallabha
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Madhva; B — Rāmānuja; D — Vallabha

    Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha all hold the world real, as the body of Brahman, as a dependent reality eternally distinct from God, and as Brahman's unchanging manifestation respectively. Śaṅkara alone holds it vyāvahārika, sublated by knowledge of Brahman.

  10. How many kinds of difference (bheda) does Madhva's doctrine of pañca-bheda list? Type the number.

    Numerical answer — type the value.

    Show answer

    Answer: 5

    Five: God–soul, God–matter, soul–soul, soul–matter and matter–matter. With three kinds of entity (God, souls, matter), there are three cross-pairs plus the two within-kind pairs among the many (souls, matter); God, being one, has no within-kind difference.