According to Cārvāka, consciousness arises from the combination of the elements just as:

Intoxicating power arises from fermented ingredients none of which is intoxicating alone

A rope is mistaken for a snake in dim light

Intoxicating power arises from fermented ingredients none of which is intoxicating alone

A pot is produced by the potter from clay

Milk transforms itself into curd

Assertion (A): Cārvāka rejects anumāna as a source of certain knowledge. Reason (R): Vyāpti, the universal concomitance on which inference rests, cannot be established by perception, which grasps only particular present cases. Choose the correct option.

Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A

Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A

Assertion (A): In the Jaina list of substances, dharma is the medium of motion. Reason (R): In Jainism, dharma means the merit that results from good actions. Choose the correct option.

Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A

Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A

Classical Indian Philosophy I: Vedic and Upaniṣadic Thought, Cārvāka and Jainism

Unit 1 of the Philosophy syllabus is headed "Classical Indian: Epistemology and Metaphysics" and runs from the Vedas to the five schools of Vedānta. This chapter takes its first three blocks. The Vedic and Upaniṣadic block asks for ṛta, the place of yajña (sacrifice), the hymns of creation, the self and the not-self, the four states of consciousness and Brahman. The Cārvāka block asks for the one school that accepts perception alone and treats consciousness as a by-product of matter. The Jaina block asks for its account of reality (sat, dravya, guṇa, paryāya), the division of jīva and ajīva, and the three linked doctrines of anekāntavāda, syādvāda and nayavāda with the Jaina theory of knowledge. Questions on this material are usually matching (text to doctrine, term to meaning) and statement-based, so the chapter keeps the Sanskrit exact and the sources named. Sanskrit terms are written in IAST throughout.

1. The Vedic world: ṛta, yajña and the hymns of creation

Ṛta is the Ṛgvedic word for the cosmic order: the regularity by which the sun rises, the seasons turn and the rivers flow, and at the same time the moral order by which promises are kept and truth is spoken. The gods do not create ṛta; they guard it. Varuṇa is its chief custodian, and the opposite of ṛta is anṛta (falsehood, disorder). Because the one order holds in nature, in ritual and in conduct, the Vedic world does not separate the divine and the human realms sharply: humans sustain the order through sacrifice and truthfulness, and the gods reciprocate. The later concept of dharma inherits much of ṛta's work, and the pairing ṛta and satya reappears in Unit 3.

Yajña (sacrifice) is the central institution of Vedic religion. It is an exchange between humans and gods conducted through Agni, the fire that carries the offering upward and is called the priest and messenger of the gods. Its importance is not only devotional: the sacrifice was believed to maintain the cosmic order itself, so ritual precision mattered. The Brāhmaṇa texts develop this into a theory in which the correctly performed rite produces its result almost automatically, which is the root of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā view that the Veda is chiefly a body of injunctions about ritual action. The Upaniṣads later internalise the sacrifice, reading it as meditation and knowledge rather than external offering.

The three creation hymns of the Ṛgveda most often asked
Hymn	Location	Account of creation
Nāsadīya Sūkta	Ṛgveda 10.129	"Then there was neither non-existence nor existence": a single "That One" (tad ekam) breathed without air; desire (kāma) was the first seed of mind; ends in doubt whether even the overseer in the highest heaven knows
Puruṣa Sūkta	Ṛgveda 10.90	The cosmos arises from the sacrifice of the thousand-headed cosmic person (Puruṣa); the social orders, the sun, moon and gods come from his body
Hiraṇyagarbha Sūkta	Ṛgveda 10.121	A golden embryo arose in the beginning as the one lord of creation; refrain "to which god shall we offer our oblation?" (kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema)

⚠️ Nāsadīya ends in doubt, not in a creator

An option saying the Nāsadīya Sūkta affirms a personal creator god who made the world out of nothing is wrong. Its last verse says the one who oversees it in the highest heaven "surely knows, or perhaps he does not know". That speculative, agnostic close is exactly why it is quoted as the beginning of Indian philosophical enquiry.

2. The Upaniṣads: Ātman, the four states and Brahman

The Upaniṣads turn from ritual to the question "what is the self?" The answer is reached by setting aside what the self is not. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad describes five sheaths (kośa) that are progressively subtler but still not-self: the sheath of food (annamaya), of vital breath (prāṇamaya), of mind (manomaya), of understanding (vijñānamaya) and of bliss (ānandamaya). The Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Book 8) tells how Prajāpati taught Indra and Virocana: Virocana was satisfied that the self is the body reflected in water, while Indra returned three times, rejecting the body, the dreaming self and the self in dreamless sleep, until he was taught the self that is immortal and free from evil. The method is negation: neti neti, "not this, not this", in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad's words.

The four states of the self (Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad)
State	Name of the self in it	What it knows
Jāgrat (waking)	Vaiśvānara	Outward-knowing; enjoys gross objects
Svapna (dream)	Taijasa	Inward-knowing; enjoys subtle objects made by mind
Suṣupti (dreamless sleep)	Prājña	A mass of consciousness, blissful, with no object and no desire
Turīya (the fourth)	The Self itself (Ātman)	Not a state beside the others but their witness: peaceful, non-dual, beyond description

Brahman is the ultimate ground from which beings are born, by which they live and into which they return (Taittirīya 3.1). The Taittirīya defines it as "satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma" (Brahman is reality, knowledge, infinite), and the formula sat-cit-ānanda (being, consciousness, bliss) became standard in Vedānta. The central Upaniṣadic insight is that Ātman and Brahman are one, stated in the four mahāvākyas (great sayings), one traditionally assigned to each Veda.

The four mahāvākyas
Saying	Meaning	Upaniṣad	Veda
prajñānaṃ brahma	Consciousness is Brahman	Aitareya	Ṛgveda
ahaṃ brahmāsmi	I am Brahman	Bṛhadāraṇyaka	Yajurveda (Śukla)
tat tvam asi	That thou art	Chāndogya	Sāmaveda
ayam ātmā brahma	This Self is Brahman	Māṇḍūkya	Atharvaveda

ℹ️ How the syllabus prints these terms

The extracted text of the official document is damaged here: yajña appears with a Greek letter in place of ñ, "Susupti" has lost its diacritics (suṣupti), and "Brahmaṇ" carries a retroflex ṇ that the word does not have (brahman, with a dental n). These are artefacts of the printed text, not alternative spellings; the chapter uses the standard forms.

3. Cārvāka: perception alone

Cārvāka, also called Lokāyata ("confined to the world"), is the materialist school traditionally traced to Bṛhaspati. Its own sūtras are lost, so it is known mostly through its opponents, above all the first chapter of Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (14th century), with Jayarāśi's Tattvopaplavasiṃha (8th century) as a rare surviving text of its sceptical wing. Its epistemology accepts pratyakṣa (perception) as the only pramāṇa; its metaphysics accepts only the four perceptible elements, earth, water, fire and air, and rejects ākāśa because ether is not perceived.

Against anumāna (inference): inference depends on vyāpti, the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major (all smoke with fire). Perception gives only particular cases, present ones, never all past, present and future cases; a further inference cannot establish vyāpti without circularity or regress; testimony cannot establish it because testimony itself rests on inference; and upamāna gives only similarity. So inference yields at best probability, useful in practice but never certain.
Against śabda (testimony): the word of a trustworthy person is accepted only because we infer that he is trustworthy, so testimony collapses into inference. The Vedas in particular are rejected for self-contradiction, tautology and falsehood; the verse the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha quotes says their authors were "buffoons, knaves and demons".
Consciousness as epiphenomenon: consciousness is not a separate substance but a property that emerges when the four elements combine in the form of a body, as the intoxicating power (madaśakti) emerges from fermented ingredients none of which is intoxicating alone. It perishes with the body; hence "the person is the body qualified by consciousness" (caitanya-viśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ), and there is no rebirth, heaven, hell or karma to be feared.

🎯 The standard reply to Cārvāka

Every other school points out that the Cārvāka refutation of inference is itself an inference: to say "inference is invalid because vyāpti cannot be known" is to argue from a general premise. Equally, to deny that anything unperceived exists (other minds, the past, the absent) goes beyond perception. Later Cārvākas such as Purandara answered by accepting inference about perceptible things for practical life while rejecting it for the supersensible (God, soul, afterlife). Their ethics, the pursuit of pleasure (kāma) with wealth (artha) as its means, is taken up in Unit 3.

4. Jainism: reality, substance and the six dravyas

The classical statement is Umāsvāti's Tattvārtha Sūtra, accepted by both Śvetāmbara and Digambara. Its definition of the real is "utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṃ sat": the real is what is characterised by origination, destruction and permanence together. A gold pot is destroyed when a crown is made, the crown originates, and the gold endures. This is the metaphysical root of anekāntavāda: reality is neither the permanent being of the Vedāntin nor the momentary flux of the Buddhist, but both permanence and change in different respects.

A dravya (substance) is "guṇa-paryāyavad dravyam", that which possesses qualities and modes. Guṇas are the qualities that always accompany a substance (consciousness in the soul, colour and touch in matter); paryāyas are its changing modes (the particular states it passes through). The substances divide into jīva (the conscious, the soul) and ajīva (the non-conscious), and the ajīva comprises pudgala (matter), dharma (the medium of motion), adharma (the medium of rest), ākāśa (space) and kāla (time). Five of the six, all except time, are astikāya, "extended" substances that occupy many space-points.

⚠️ Dharma and adharma are not merit and demerit here

In the list of Jaina substances, dharma is the medium that makes motion possible (as water for a fish) and adharma the medium that makes rest possible (as shade for a traveller). An option glossing them as virtue and vice, or as merit and demerit, is the standard trap.

5. Anekāntavāda, syādvāda, nayavāda and the Jaina theory of knowledge

Anekāntavāda (non-one-sidedness) is the metaphysical thesis that every real has infinitely many attributes, so no single statement captures it. Nayavāda is its analytic side: a naya is a standpoint from which one aspect is described, and a view that mistakes its partial standpoint for the whole truth is a durnaya (a false standpoint). Syādvāda is its logical side: every judgement should be qualified by syāt, "in some respect" or "from a certain standpoint", which gives the sevenfold predication (saptabhaṅgī). The parable of the blind men and the elephant illustrates the whole: each is right about the part he touches and wrong to deny the others.

The sevenfold predication (saptabhaṅgī)
No.	Form	Sense
1	syād asti	In some respect it is
2	syān nāsti	In some respect it is not
3	syād asti ca nāsti ca	In some respect it is, and is not (successively)
4	syād avaktavyaḥ	In some respect it is indescribable (both at once)
5	syād asti ca avaktavyaḥ	In some respect it is, and is indescribable
6	syān nāsti ca avaktavyaḥ	In some respect it is not, and is indescribable
7	syād asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyaḥ	In some respect it is, is not, and is indescribable

The seven nayas are usually listed as naigama (the teleological or non-distinguishing standpoint), saṅgraha (the collective, looking at the universal), vyavahāra (the practical, looking at particulars), ṛjusūtra (the momentary, looking at the present mode only), śabda (the verbal, synonymy by tense and gender), samabhirūḍha (the etymological) and evaṃbhūta (the "such-like", applying a word only while its meaning is actually being fulfilled). The first three are called dravyārthika (substance-oriented) and the last four paryāyārthika (mode-oriented).

The Jaina theory of knowledge recognises five kinds of knowledge (jñāna): mati (sensory and mental cognition), śruta (knowledge from scripture and language), avadhi (clairvoyance of distant material things), manaḥparyāya (direct knowledge of others' thoughts) and kevala (omniscience of the liberated). The Tattvārtha Sūtra then makes a distinctive move: mati and śruta are parokṣa (indirect) because they depend on the senses and mind, while avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala are pratyakṣa (direct) because the soul knows without instruments. Later logicians such as Akalaṅka allowed ordinary sense perception to be called sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa, "direct in the conventional sense", to align with the other schools.

🧠 Remember the Jaina inversion

In most Indian schools sense perception is the paradigm of pratyakṣa. In the Jaina scheme it is parokṣa, because "direct" means known by the soul itself (akṣa is read as jīva). So "mati and śruta are parokṣa" is a true statement, and questions often turn on it.

Key takeaways

Ṛta is the Ṛgvedic order of nature, ritual and morality guarded by Varuṇa; yajña, carried by Agni, was believed to sustain it, and the Upaniṣads internalised the sacrifice as knowledge.
Creation hymns: Nāsadīya (10.129, ends in doubt), Puruṣa (10.90, cosmic sacrifice), Hiraṇyagarbha (10.121, golden embryo).
Māṇḍūkya's four states are jāgrat (Vaiśvānara), svapna (Taijasa), suṣupti (Prājña) and turīya, the witnessing Self; the four mahāvākyas state the identity of Ātman and Brahman.
Cārvāka accepts perception alone, rejects inference because vyāpti cannot be established, reduces testimony to inference, admits four elements and treats consciousness as an emergent property of the body.
Jainism defines the real as origination, destruction and permanence together; six dravyas (five astikāya); anekāntavāda, nayavāda (seven nayas) and syādvāda (seven predications); five jñānas, with mati and śruta counted parokṣa.

Practice questions (10)

Attempt each one before opening the answer. Every explanation names the tempting wrong option as well as the right one, because that is where marks are lost.

Which Upaniṣad describes the four states of consciousness, jāgrat, svapna, suṣupti and turīya?
1. Kaṭha
2. Kena
3. Māṇḍūkya
4. Īśa
Show answer
Answer: C — Māṇḍūkya
The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, the shortest of the principal Upaniṣads, analyses the syllable Om into the three states and the fourth (turīya). The Kaṭha is the dialogue of Naciketas and Yama; the Īśa and Kena deal with renunciation and the power behind the senses.
In the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, the self in the dream state is called:
1. Taijasa
2. Prājña
3. Hiraṇyagarbha
4. Vaiśvānara
Show answer
Answer: A — Taijasa
Taijasa, "the luminous", is the dreamer who enjoys subtle objects made by the mind. Vaiśvānara is the waking self and Prājña the self in dreamless sleep. Hiraṇyagarbha is the golden embryo of Ṛgveda 10.121 and, in Vedānta, the cosmic counterpart of the subtle body, not the Māṇḍūkya name of the dreamer.
Match the mahāvākya with its Upaniṣad: "tat tvam asi".
1. Aitareya
2. Bṛhadāraṇyaka
3. Māṇḍūkya
4. Chāndogya
Show answer
Answer: D — Chāndogya
"Tat tvam asi" is Uddālaka Āruṇi's teaching to his son Śvetaketu in the Chāndogya (Sāmaveda). "Ahaṃ brahmāsmi" is Bṛhadāraṇyaka, "prajñānaṃ brahma" Aitareya and "ayam ātmā brahma" Māṇḍūkya.
According to Cārvāka, consciousness arises from the combination of the elements just as:
1. A rope is mistaken for a snake in dim light
2. Intoxicating power arises from fermented ingredients none of which is intoxicating alone
3. A pot is produced by the potter from clay
4. Milk transforms itself into curd
Show answer
Answer: B — Intoxicating power arises from fermented ingredients none of which is intoxicating alone
The fermentation analogy (madaśakti from kiṇva and other ingredients) is Cārvāka's model of emergence: a new property appears from a combination whose parts lack it. The rope-snake is the Advaita illustration of superimposition, and milk into curd is the Sāṃkhya example of satkāryavāda.
In the Jaina classification of knowledge in the Tattvārtha Sūtra, which pair is parokṣa (indirect)?
1. Śruta and kevala
2. Mati and śruta
3. Manaḥparyāya and kevala
4. Avadhi and manaḥparyāya
Show answer
Answer: B — Mati and śruta
Mati and śruta depend on the senses and the mind and are therefore parokṣa; avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala are known by the soul directly and are pratyakṣa. This reverses the usual Indian classification in which sense perception is the model of pratyakṣa.
Assertion (A): Cārvāka rejects anumāna as a source of certain knowledge. Reason (R): Vyāpti, the universal concomitance on which inference rests, cannot be established by perception, which grasps only particular present cases. Choose the correct option.
1. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
2. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
3. A is true, but R is false
4. A is false, but R is true
Show answer
Answer: A — Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
Both are true and R is the Cārvāka's own reason: perception cannot cover all past, present and future instances, and any other means of establishing vyāpti either presupposes inference or regresses. Hence inference yields probability, not certainty.
Assertion (A): In the Jaina list of substances, dharma is the medium of motion. Reason (R): In Jainism, dharma means the merit that results from good actions. Choose the correct option.
1. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
2. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
3. A is true, but R is false
4. A is false, but R is true
Show answer
Answer: C — A is true, but R is false
A is true: dharmāstikāya is the medium of motion, as water is for a fish, and adharma the medium of rest. R is false in this context: merit is puṇya, and the Jaina dravyas dharma and adharma are cosmological, not ethical.
Which of the following are among the five astikāya (extended substances) of Jainism? Select all that apply.
1. Adharma
2. Ākāśa
3. Pudgala
4. Kāla
Show answer
Answer: A — Adharma; B — Ākāśa; C — Pudgala
The astikāyas are jīva, pudgala, dharma, adharma and ākāśa. Kāla (time) is a dravya but not an astikāya, because it does not extend over many space-points; that is why there are six substances but five astikāyas.
Which of the following are sheaths (kośa) of the self listed in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad? Select all that apply.
1. Prāṇamaya
2. Ānandamaya
3. Vijñānamaya
4. Turīyamaya
Show answer
Answer: A — Prāṇamaya; B — Ānandamaya; C — Vijñānamaya
The five sheaths are annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya and ānandamaya. Turīya is the fourth state of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, not a sheath, and "turīyamaya" is not a term of the doctrine.
How many predications (bhaṅgas) make up the Jaina saptabhaṅgī? Type the number.
Numerical answer — type the value.
Show answer
Answer: 7
Seven: syād asti, syān nāsti, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād avaktavyaḥ, and the three combinations of avaktavya with the first three. "Sapta" means seven, and three basic values (is, is not, indescribable) give 2³ − 1 = 7 non-empty combinations.