Law of Crimes II: Offences against the Human Body, and Offences against Women and Children

This chapter takes two of Unit IV's items that belong together because both protect the person: offences against the human body (item 4) and offences against women and children (item 7). Homicide is the most examined topic in the whole unit, and the leading cases, Reg v Govinda (1876), Virsa Singh (1958), K.M. Nanavati (1961) and Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976), were decided under the Indian Penal Code 1860. They remain good law for the principles they state, because the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), in force from 1 July 2024, keeps the structure of culpable homicide and murder unchanged. Each BNS provision is given with its former IPC section; where this chapter describes a provision without a BNS number, it does so deliberately rather than risk a wrong one.

1. Culpable homicide and murder

Culpable homicide (BNS s.100, formerly IPC s.299) is causing death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. Murder (BNS s.101, formerly IPC s.300) is culpable homicide with a higher degree of intention or knowledge, in four clauses, unless one of five exceptions applies. In State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) the Supreme Court described culpable homicide as the genus and murder as its species, and identified three degrees: murder (the gravest), culpable homicide of the first degree punishable under the first part of the old s.304, and of the second degree under its second part.

The comparison drawn by Melvill J in Reg v Govinda (1876)
Culpable homicide (BNS s.100; IPC s.299)Murder (BNS s.101; IPC s.300)
(a) Intention of causing deathFirstly: intention of causing death
(b) Intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause deathSecondly: intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the particular person harmed; thirdly: intention of causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
(c) Knowledge that the act is likely to cause deathFourthly: knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, committed without excuse for incurring the risk

The difference is one of degree of probability: "likely" in culpable homicide, "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" and "in all probability" in murder. Virsa Singh v State of Punjab (1958) settled how to apply clause thirdly. The prosecution must prove that a bodily injury is present, its nature, that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury (not that it was accidental or of another kind), and that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The last inquiry is objective and has nothing to do with the offender's intention; once the four steps are proved, the offence is murder.

The five exceptions, carried unchanged into BNS s.101
Exception to murderConditions and leading authority
Grave and sudden provocationDeprived of self-control by provocation that is both grave and sudden; the test is whether a reasonable person of the same class of society would be so provoked, and words or gestures can suffice. In K.M. Nanavati v State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 605) the accused had time to cool between his wife's confession and the shooting, so the exception failed and he was convicted of murder
Exceeding private defenceDeath caused in good faith exceeding the right, without premeditation and without intending more harm than necessary
Public servant exceeding powersActing in good faith believing the act lawful and necessary for duty, without ill-will
Sudden fightWithout premeditation, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, without taking undue advantage or acting cruelly
ConsentThe person killed, above eighteen, suffers death or takes the risk with his own consent
⚠️ Nanavati was convicted of murder
The Nanavati case is remembered for the jury's acquittal, but the Bombay High Court set the verdict aside and the Supreme Court upheld his conviction for murder, holding that the provocation was neither grave and sudden at the moment of the shooting nor within the exception after three hours had passed. It is the leading authority on the reasonable-person test in India.

2. Other offences against the human body

Offences affecting life and body
OffenceBNS (former IPC)Key point
Punishment for murders.103 (s.302)Death or imprisonment for life, and fine; s.103(2) covers mob lynching by five or more acting in concert on specified grounds
Culpable homicide not amounting to murders.105 (s.304)Two limbs: act done with intention (graver) or with knowledge only
Causing death by negligences.106 (s.304A)Rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide; the maximum rises from two years under the IPC to five, with a lower maximum of two years for a registered medical practitioner; the hit-and-run provision in s.106(2) was kept in abeyance after protests. Medical negligence needs gross negligence (Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, 2005)
Abetment of suicides.108 (s.306)Requires instigation or intentional aid proximate to the suicide; Gian Kaur v State of Punjab (1996) upheld the offence
Attempt to murders.109 (s.307)The intention or knowledge of murder plus an act towards it; injury is not essential
Hurt and grievous hurtFormerly IPC ss.319 and 320Hurt is bodily pain, disease or infirmity; grievous hurt is one of eight listed kinds, among them emasculation, permanent loss of sight or hearing of either eye or ear, loss or impairment of a member or joint, permanent disfigurement of head or face, fracture or dislocation, and hurt endangering life

The BNS does not carry forward the general offence of attempting suicide (IPC s.309); it punishes only an attempt made to compel or restrain a public servant in the discharge of official duty. This follows section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act 2017, which presumes a person who attempts suicide to be under severe stress. Kidnapping and abduction are distinct: kidnapping from lawful guardianship concerns minors and persons of unsound mind and is complete when the person is taken out of the guardian's keeping (the Penal Code set the age at sixteen for boys and eighteen for girls, IPC s.361); abduction concerns any person, requires force or deceitful means, and is a continuing offence punishable only when combined with a further purpose. In S. Varadarajan v State of Madras (1965) the Supreme Court held that a minor girl near majority who voluntarily left with the accused, without any inducement by him, had not been "taken".

🎯 Why negligence is punished more heavily now
The two-year maximum under IPC s.304A was widely criticised as inadequate for road deaths caused by grossly negligent driving. The BNS raises the general maximum to five years, but keeps a lower ceiling for doctors so that the Jacob Mathew standard (only gross negligence is criminal) is not undermined by fear of prosecution.

3. Offences against women

Chapter V of the BNS groups offences against women and children, which the Penal Code had scattered across several chapters. The law was reshaped by two amendments to the Penal Code that the BNS carries forward. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983 followed the Mathura case (Tukaram v State of Maharashtra, 1979), in which the Supreme Court had acquitted policemen because the victim raised no alarm; it created custodial rape and a presumption of absence of consent. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 followed the Justice J.S. Verma Committee after the December 2012 Delhi gang rape (whose appeals ended in Mukesh v State (NCT of Delhi), 2017); it widened the definition of rape and created the offences of stalking, voyeurism, acid attack and sexual harassment. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2018 added death as a punishment for the rape of a girl under twelve.

Principal offences against women
OffenceBNS (former IPC)Key point
Rapess.63 and 64 (ss.375 and 376)Seven circumstances, including against her will, without consent, and with or without consent when she is under eighteen; the marital exception survives only for a wife not under eighteen, which codifies Independent Thought v Union of India (2017)
Sexual intercourse by deceitful meanss.69 (new)Intercourse not amounting to rape, obtained by deceitful means or a false promise of marriage without intending to fulfil it, including inducement by false promises of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity
Dowry deaths.80 (s.304B)Death by burns, bodily injury or otherwise than in normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, where soon before death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry; minimum seven years, up to life
Cruelty by husband or relativesss.85 and 86 (s.498A)Wilful conduct likely to drive her to suicide or cause grave injury, or harassment to coerce her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands for property
  • State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh (1996): a conviction can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence, and trials should be held in camera.
  • Special statutes: the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (civil remedies), the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 (codifying Vishaka, 1997), and the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act 1987.
  • Laxmi v Union of India (2014): the Supreme Court regulated the retail sale of acid and directed compensation and treatment for survivors of acid attacks.
⚠️ The marital exception is not abolished
The BNS keeps the exception that intercourse by a man with his own wife, she not being under eighteen, is not rape. Independent Thought (2017) raised the age in the exception from fifteen to eighteen; the wider question of criminalising marital rape of adult wives has been argued before the Supreme Court but is not law. An option stating that the BNS abolished the marital-rape exception is wrong.

4. Offences against children

Children are protected both by the BNS and by special statutes. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 (POCSO) is gender-neutral, defines a child as a person below eighteen, creates graded offences (penetrative, aggravated penetrative, sexual assault, sexual harassment and use of a child for pornography), reverses the burden of proof by presumptions of guilt and culpable mental state, mandates reporting, and requires child-friendly procedures in Special Courts; its 2019 amendment allowed death for aggravated penetrative sexual assault. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 makes marriages below eighteen for girls and twenty-one for boys voidable at the option of the child, and void in specified cases of trafficking or force. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 punishes cruelty to children and governs children in need of care and protection.

Special statutes protecting children
InstrumentYearCore rule
POCSO Act2012 (amended 2019)Gender-neutral protection of all persons under eighteen; presumptions against the accused; Special Courts
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act2006Child marriage voidable at the child's option; void where the child was trafficked or taken by force
Juvenile Justice Act2015Care, protection and adoption; offences of cruelty; preliminary assessment for sixteen-to-eighteen-year-olds accused of heinous offences
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act1971 (amended 2021)Lawful termination on specified grounds; the 2021 amendment extended the upper limit to twenty-four weeks for specified categories of women
ℹ️ Consent is irrelevant under eighteen
Under both the BNS and POCSO a person below eighteen cannot give legally valid consent to sexual activity. This produces hard cases involving consensual relationships between adolescents, which courts have noted with concern, but the statutory rule is clear and the age of consent has not been lowered.

Key takeaways

  • Culpable homicide is BNS s.100 (IPC s.299) and murder BNS s.101 (IPC s.300); punishment for murder is s.103 (IPC s.302), with mob lynching in s.103(2).
  • Reg v Govinda (1876) drew the table of differences; Virsa Singh (1958) gave the four-step test for clause thirdly; Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) called culpable homicide the genus and murder the species.
  • Nanavati (AIR 1962 SC 605) was convicted of murder: the provocation was not grave and sudden after time to cool; the five exceptions carry over into BNS s.101.
  • Death by negligence is BNS s.106 (IPC s.304A) with a maximum of five years; the general offence of attempting suicide (IPC s.309) is not carried forward.
  • Offences against women and children sit in BNS Chapter V: rape ss.63–64, deceitful intercourse s.69, dowry death s.80 (IPC s.304B), cruelty ss.85–86 (IPC s.498A); POCSO 2012 protects all under eighteen.

Practice questions (10)

Attempt each one before opening the answer. Every explanation names the tempting wrong option as well as the right one, because that is where marks are lost.

  1. Murder, formerly punishable under IPC s.302, is now punishable under:

    1. BNS s.100
    2. BNS s.109
    3. BNS s.105
    4. BNS s.103
    Show answer

    Answer: D — BNS s.103

    BNS s.103 prescribes death or imprisonment for life for murder. Section 100 defines culpable homicide, s.105 punishes culpable homicide not amounting to murder (formerly IPC s.304), and s.109 is attempt to murder (formerly IPC s.307).

  2. In Virsa Singh v State of Punjab (1958), the inquiry whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death was held to be:

    1. A question of the victim's particular vulnerability
    2. Relevant only to sentencing
    3. Purely objective, unrelated to the offender's intention
    4. Dependent on whether the offender knew the injury was fatal
    Show answer

    Answer: C — Purely objective, unrelated to the offender's intention

    Vivian Bose J held that once the accused is shown to have intended the particular injury found, whether that injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is an objective inference; the accused need not have known or intended that it would kill.

  3. Assertion (A): In K.M. Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court upheld the accused's conviction for murder. Reason (R): The provocation was held not to be grave and sudden because the accused had time to regain his self-control before the shooting. Choose the correct option.

    1. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
    2. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
    3. A is true, but R is false
    4. A is false, but R is true
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A

    Both are true and R explains A. The interval of about three hours between his wife's confession and the shooting, during which he collected a revolver, showed deliberation; the grave and sudden provocation exception (now in BNS s.101) did not apply.

  4. Which case described culpable homicide as the genus and murder as its species?

    1. Virsa Singh v State of Punjab (1958)
    2. State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976)
    3. Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab (2005)
    4. Reg v Govinda (1876)
    Show answer

    Answer: B — State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976)

    Sarkaria J in Rayavarapu Punnayya set out the genus-species relation and the three degrees of culpable homicide. Govinda drew the comparative table, Virsa Singh interpreted clause thirdly, and Jacob Mathew concerns criminal medical negligence.

  5. Which of the following are exceptions that reduce murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder? Select all that apply.

    1. Sudden fight without premeditation
    2. Grave and sudden provocation
    3. Consent of a person above eighteen
    4. Voluntary intoxication
    Show answer

    Answer: A — Sudden fight without premeditation; B — Grave and sudden provocation; C — Consent of a person above eighteen

    Provocation, sudden fight and consent of a person above eighteen are three of the five exceptions (the others are exceeding private defence and a public servant exceeding powers). Voluntary intoxication is not an exception; knowledge is imputed to the intoxicated offender.

  6. Dowry death, formerly IPC s.304B, is now found in:

    1. BNS s.80
    2. BNS s.69
    3. BNS s.106
    4. BNS s.85
    Show answer

    Answer: A — BNS s.80

    BNS s.80 carries dowry death, requiring death in abnormal circumstances within seven years of marriage and dowry-related cruelty soon before death. Section 85 is cruelty (formerly IPC s.498A), s.69 intercourse by deceitful means, and s.106 death by negligence.

  7. Assertion (A): The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita retains an exception for sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife. Reason (R): Independent Thought v Union of India (2017) struck down the marital-rape exception for wives of all ages. Choose the correct option.

    1. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A
    2. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A
    3. A is true, but R is false
    4. A is false, but R is true
    Show answer

    Answer: C — A is true, but R is false

    A is true: the exception survives for a wife not under eighteen. R is false: Independent Thought read down the exception only so far as it applied to wives between fifteen and eighteen; it did not decide the position of adult wives.

  8. Which of the following statements about the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 are correct? Select all that apply.

    1. It is gender-neutral as to the child
    2. It defines a child as a person below eighteen
    3. It raises presumptions against the accused in specified offences
    4. It allows a child of sixteen to give valid consent
    Show answer

    Answer: A — It is gender-neutral as to the child; B — It defines a child as a person below eighteen; C — It raises presumptions against the accused in specified offences

    POCSO protects all children below eighteen irrespective of gender and presumes guilt and culpable mental state in specified offences. It does not recognise consent below eighteen; there is no exception for a sixteen-year-old.

  9. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983, which introduced custodial rape and a presumption as to absence of consent, followed which case?

    1. Mukesh v State (NCT of Delhi) (2017)
    2. Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (1997)
    3. Tukaram v State of Maharashtra (1979), the Mathura case
    4. State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh (1996)
    Show answer

    Answer: C — Tukaram v State of Maharashtra (1979), the Mathura case

    The acquittal of policemen in the Mathura case provoked the 1983 amendment. Mukesh is the final appeal in the 2012 Delhi case that led to the 2013 amendment, Gurmit Singh concerns the prosecutrix's testimony, and Vishaka workplace sexual harassment.

  10. Under the provision on dowry death, the death must occur within how many years of marriage? Type the number.

    Numerical answer — type the value.

    Show answer

    Answer: 7

    Dowry death (BNS s.80, formerly IPC s.304B) requires death otherwise than in normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, with dowry-related cruelty or harassment soon before death; the minimum sentence is also seven years.